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ABSTRACT
We study the inferences about labor adjustment costs obtained by the “gap methodology” of
Caballero and Engel [1993] and Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger [1997]. In that approach, the policy
function of a manufacturing plant is assumed to depend on the gap between a target and the current level
of employment. Using time series observations, these studies reject the quadratic cost of adjustment
model and find that aggregate employment dynamics depend on the cross sectional distribution of
employment gaps. We argue that these conclusions may not be justified. Instead these findings may
reflect difficulties measuring the gap. Thus it appears that the gap methodology, as currently employed,
may be unable to: (i) identify the costs of labor adjustment and (ii) assess the aggregate implications of
labor adjustment costs.
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In recent contributions, Caballero and Engel [1993], hereafter CE, and Caballero, Engel
and Haltiwanger [1997], hereafter CEH, investigate labor adjustment using a methodol-
ogy, reviewed extensively below, that encompasses both convex and nonconvex adjustment
processes. With this methodology, employment changes are postulated to depend on the
gap between the actual and target levels of employment.1 Both studies reach very simi-
lar conclusions on the nature of labor adjustment. The relationship between employment
adjustment and the employment gap is nonlinear: the response to a gap is increasing
in the absolute value of the gap. More importantly, both studies ￿nd evidence of these
nonlinearities in time series data.
This paper questions the methodology and thus the conclusions of these studies, partic-
ularly the aggregate implications of the nonlinear plant level adjustment.2 We argue that
these reported nonlinearities may re￿ect diﬃculties in measurement of the gap rather than
economic fundamentals.
The approach taken by CE and CEH relies upon a hypothesis that employment changes
(∆e) respond to a gap (z) between the desired and actual number of workers at a plant.
Throughout we refer to z as the employment gap and ∆e
z as the adjustment rate.T h e
gain to the gap approach is that the choice of employment, an inherently diﬃcult dynamic
optimization problem, can be characterized through a nonlinear relationship between (∆e)
and (z). That is, the adjustment rate can be a nonlinear function of z.
However, there is no ￿free lunch￿: the desired number of workers and hence the employ-
ment gap is unobservable. Thus in order to confront data, this approach needs an auxiliary
theory to infer z from observables. We argue that these measurement problems may be
severe enough to bias the inferences from these studies.
This paper constructs a dynamic model of labor adjustment assuming quadratic ad-
justment costs and uses the employment gap approach to analyze its implications. While
both CE and CEH do extensive data analysis, they do not provide a mapping from their
reduced form estimates to parameters of the adjustment cost function.3 We use simulated
data from our dynamic model to characterize the mapping from the structural parameters
of adjustment costs to the adjustment functions and aggregate employment relationships
characterized by CE and CEH.
1Hamermesh [1989] uses a gap methodology as well but does not adopt the approach of estimating a
nonlinear hazard function (explained below) to infer the nature of adjustment costs. Hence we focus on
CE and CEH in this discussion of methodology.
2To the extent that this approach is used in numerous other applications, our concerns are relevant for
those exercises as well.
3CE do provide a static model which they use to generate a target level of employment. We embed
their static model into a dynamic optimization problem.
2We do not contest the general view of non-linear employment adjustment at the plant
level. This ￿nding is consistent with other evidence that points to inactivity as well as
b u r s t so fe m p l o y m e n ta d j u s t m e n ta tt h ep l a n tl e v e l . 4
But, does this plant-level nonlinearity matter for aggregate employment dynamics? CE
and CEH, using the gap methodology, conclude that indeed it does. This ￿nding is a major
contribution of these papers. It is potentially important for business cycle and policy
analyzes as it implies macroeconomics must take plant-level distributions into account.
The ￿nding implies that linear time series representations of aggregate employment, as in
Sargent [1978], are misspeci￿ed.
We ￿nd:
￿ if the gap is correctly measured, the adjustment rate is essentially constant and the
cross sectional distribution of employment gaps is irrelvant for aggregate employment
dynamics
￿ if the employment gap is mismeasured,t h e n
1. a quadratic cost of adjustment model can generate a nonlinear adjustment rate
(∆e
z depends nonlinearily on z )
2. aggregate employment dynamics can depend on the cross sectional distribution
of the employment gap
￿ the gap measures created by CE and CEH do not correspond very closely to the
actual gap measures in the quadratic cost of adjustment model.
To interpret these results, note that inferences from the gap approach are based upon the
following argument: if adjustment costs are quadratic, then the adjustment rate is constant
implying that aggregate employment is independent of the cross sectional distribution of
employment gaps.5 This proposition seems valid when the gap is properly measured. But
it fails using the procedures of CE and CEH to measure these gaps. We ￿nd that both
the CE and CEH procedures will reject the null hypothesis of quadratic adjustment costs
4For example, Hamermesh [1989] provides a revealing discussion of lumpy labor adjustment at a set of
manufacturing plants. Davis and Haltiwanger [1992] document large employment changes at the plant level.
CEH also report evidence of inactivity in plant level employment adjustment. There seems little doubt
that explanation of plant level employment dynamics requires a model of adjustment that is richer than the
quadratic adjustment cost structure and includes some forms of non-diﬀerentiability and/or nonconvexity.
5Clearly, if the hazard function is independent of the gap, then the cross sectional distribution of the
gap is irrelevant for aggregate behavior. The fact that the partial adjustment model implies a ￿at hazard
is essentially by construction. The link between the quadratic cost of adjustment structure and the partial
adjustment model is more subtle and is discussed further below.
3even if that hypothesis is true. A methodology that is unbiased under the null hypothesis
of quadratic adjustment costs is needed to assess that model.
We thus conclude that the time series evidence of nonlinear hazards reported by CE and
CEH should not be taken as a ￿nding against the quadratic adjustment cost model. Nor
do their results provide evidence that nonlinear behavior at the plant level has aggregate
eﬀects.
2 The Gap Approach: An Overview
We begin with a summary of the methodology employed by CE and CEH as well as a more
precise statement of their ￿ndings. This sets the background for our analysis.
2.1 Gap Methodology
We follow the notation and presentation in CEH.6 The gap between the desired employment
and the actual employment (in logs) in period t for plant i is de￿ned as:
￿ zi,t ≡ e
∗
i,t − ei,t−1.( 1 )
Here e∗
i,t is the desired level of employment given the realization of all period t random
variables and ei,t−1 is the level of employment prior to any period t adjustments. Thus ￿ zi,t
represents a gap between the state of the plant at the beginning of the period and the level
of employment it would choose if it could ￿costlessly￿ alter employment.
CEH hypothesize a relationship between employment growth ∆ei,t and ￿ zi,t given by:
∆ei,t = φ(￿ zi,t). (2)
Thus a key issue is characterizing the policy function, φ(zi,t), and inferring properties of
adjustment costs from it. In some cases, it is convenient to refer to an adjustment rate or
hazard function:7
Φ(￿ zi,t) ≡ φ(￿ zi,t)/￿ zi,t.
Specifying that employment adjustment depends only on the gap is an assumption: the
validity of this approximation to the optimal policy function of the plant can be evaluated
using our structural model.
6The notation and de￿nitions in CEH diﬀer from those used by CE. In particular, CE de￿ne the gap as
￿ zi,t ≡ ei,t − e∗
i,t. Accordingly their expression for aggregate employment growth diﬀers from that in CEH.
7There are two interpretations of this function. Either Φ(z) represents the magnitude of adjustment
(e.g. the fraction of a gap that is closed) or a probability of adjustment. The interpretation, of course,
would depend on the nature of adjustment costs.
4As the gap is central to this analysis, it is important to be very precise about how it is
de￿ned and measured. The key is the meaning of ￿costlessly adjusting employment.￿ In
fact, there are two ways to characterize the target and, as we demonstrate in our quanti-
tative analysis, the results depend on the de￿nition.
First, one could de￿ne the target as the level of employment that would arise if there
were never any costs of adjustment.8 This version of the target is quite easy to characterize
since it solves a static optimization problem. This is termed the static target in the
discussion that follows.
Second, one could construct a target measure in which the adjustment costs are removed
for a single period. The target would correspond to the level of employment to which an
optimizing agent would eventually adjust to in the absence of any changes in the stochastic
variables. This is termed the frictionless target. For the quadratic adjustment model,
this would be the level of employment where the state dependent policy function crosses
the 45 degree line.
This hypothesized relationship between employment changes and the gap cannot be
implemented directly since ￿ zi,t is a theoretical construct that cannot be directly observed:
there exists no data set which includes ￿ zi,t. In the literature, various approaches have been
pursued.
2.2 CEH Measurement of the Gap and Findings
CEH hypothesize a second relationship between another (closely related) measure of the
gap, (￿ z1
i,t), and plant speci￿c deviations in hours:
￿ z
1
i,t = θ(hi,t − ﬂ h). (3)
Here ￿ z1
i,t is the gap in period t after adjustments in the level of e have been made: ￿ z1
i,t =
￿ zi,t − ∆ei,t. 9
8This approach to approximating the dynamic optimization problem is applied extensively but, from
our perspective, places too much emphasis on static optimization. Nickell [1978] says,
￿... the majority of existing models of factor demand simply analyze the optimal ad-
justment of the ￿rm towards a static equilibrium and it is very diﬃcult to deduce from this
anything whatever about optimal behavior when there is no ￿equilibrium￿ to aim at.￿
9Implicitly this assumes that there is no lag between the decision to adjust employment and the actual
adjustment. That is, unlike the time to build aspect of investment, employment adjustments take place
immediately. We use this timing assumption in our structural model.
Further, we have removed the heterogeneity in ﬂ h and in θ that is important for the empirical imple-
mentation in CEH. Finally, note that by assumption ﬂ h is independent of any shocks to the pro￿tability of
employment. We will argue below that this is an important restriction.
5Intuitively, θ should be positive. As pro￿tability rises, hours and the desired number of
workers will both increase. The gap decreases as workers (e) are added and hours fall closer
to ﬂ h. Thus the supposed relationship between this measure of the gap and hours deviations
seems reasonable both in terms of the response of these variables to a shock and in terms
of transition dynamics. Note though that the correlation between hours and employees is
somewhat complicated: the shock leads to positive comovement between e and h but, in
the adjustment process, the comovement is negative.
Rewriting this relationship in terms of the pre-adjustment gap leads to:
￿ zi,t = θ(hi,t − ﬂ h)+∆ei,t. (4)
H e n c e ,g i v e na ne s t i m a t eo fθ, one can infer ￿ zi,t from hours and employment observations.
The issue is estimating θ. Using (1) in (4) and taking diﬀerences yields:
∆ei,t = −θ∆hi,t + ∆e
∗
i,t
Adding a constant (α) and noting that ∆e∗
i,t is not observable, CEH estimate θ from:
∆ei,t = α − θ∆hi,t + εi,t. (5)
As CEH note, estimation of this equation may yield biased estimates of θ since the error
term (principally ∆e∗
i,t) is likely to be correlated with changes in hours. That is, a positive
shock to pro￿tability may induce the plant to increase hours (at least in the short run) and
will generally cause the desired level of employment to increase as well. CEH argue that
this problem can be (partially) remedied by looking at periods of large adjustment since
then the changes in hours and employment will overwhelm the error.10 As we proceed,
evaluating the implications of this bias will be important.
CEH use their plant level measures of the gap in two ways. First, they analyze the rela-
tionship between employment adjustment and employment gaps at the plant level. Second,
they investigate aggregate implications by estimating a reduced form hazard function from
time series. Letting ft(z)b et h ep e r i o dt probability density function of employment gaps





10They also note the presence of measurement error, which they address through the use of a reverse
regression exercise. We have not included measurement error in our simulated environment.
6As Φ(z) is the adjustment rate or hazard function indicating the fraction of the gap that
is closed by employment adjustment, zΦ(z) is the size of the employment adjustment
for plants with a gap of z. As in CEH [Section IV], simpli￿cation based upon the given
speci￿cations of a hazard function produces an aggregate relationship between employment
changes and non-centered moments of z.
The CEH ￿ndings can be summarized as:
￿ using (5), CEH report a mean (across 2-digit industries) estimate of θ =1 .26. Their
estimate comes from using observations in which percent changes in both employment
and hours exceed one standard deviation of the respective series.
￿ using their estimates of θ to construct a gap measure (￿ zi,t), CEH (Figure 1a) ￿nd a
nonlinear relationship between the average adjustment rate, Φ(￿ zi,t), and ￿ zi,t
￿ CEH specify that Φ(z) is piece-wise linear. Table 3 in CEH summarizes aggregate
implications and indicates that employment growth depends on the second moment
of the distribution of employment gaps.
2.3 CE Measurement of the Gap and Findings
In contrast to CEH, CE do not estimate θ but instead calibrate it from a structural model of
static optimization by a plant with market power. Appendix A characterizes the mapping
from the structural parameters of the quadratic adjustment model (presented in the next
section) to θ.
An important element in their approach is the use of a static target. CE argue that the
static targets are the appropriate benchmarks for measuring employment gaps if shocks
follow a random walk. But, if the shocks are stationary, then this measure will not provide
the relevant employment target for a plant. Instead of adhering to the static solution, plants
will solve a dynamic optimization problem, explored below, taking into account conditional
expectations of future shocks. Plants balance the gains from adjusting to productivity
shocks against the costs imposed on employment adjustment in the future. We analyze the
bias in the measurement of the gap stemming from the use of a static target.
As CE do not have plant level data, their estimation uses aggregate observations on
net and gross ￿ows for US manufacturing employment to estimate a hazard function. CE
consider both a constant and a quadratic speci￿cation for Φ(z). They ￿nd that a quadratic
hazard speci￿cation ￿ts the data better than the ￿at hazard.11
11There is a diﬀerence then between the CE and CEH approaches to characterizing aggregate employment
growth: CE impose a quadratic hazard while CEH work with a piecewise linear adjustment function. Our
analysis will use both of these speci￿cations.
73 A Dynamic Optimization Framework
Our analysis builds from the speci￿cation of a dynamic optimization problem at the plant
level. Our structure is purposefully close to that outlined in CE. 12 We use the model as a
data generating mechanism to evaluate the CE and CEH methodologies.
3.1 Quadratic Adjustment Cost Model
Letting A represent the pro￿tability of a production unit (e.g. a plant), we consider the
following dynamic programming problem:
V (A,e−1)=m a x
h,e







e−1 + βEA0|AV (A
0,e). (7)
Here h represents the input of hours by a worker, e−1 is the inherited stock of workers
before quits occur (at an exogenous rate of q)a n de is the stock of current workers.13 Note
the timing assumption of the model: workers hired in a given period become productive
immediately.
For our analysis we will work with a Cobb-Douglas production function in which the
labor input is simply the product eh. Allowing for market power by the plant, we obtain:
R(A,e,h)=A(eh)
α (8)
where the parameter α is determined by the shares of capital and labor in the production
function as well as the elasticity of demand.
The costs of adjustment are assumed to be a quadratic function of the percent change
in the stock of workers that are employed (e) and the number of workers at the start of
the current period.14 That is, the adjustment cost arises for net not gross hires. In (7), ν
parameterizes the level of the adjustment cost function.
12For example, we have not added stochastic adjustment costs since these would drive an immediate
wedge between employment changes and any gap measure. CE also include a idiosyncratic shock to the
plant￿s gap that has no apparent counterpart in the optimization model. We did not know how to include
this in our formulation.
13Note that there is a slight change in notation here as e and h both refer to levels and not log levels.
Other inputs into the production function, such as capital and energy are assumed, for simplicity, to be
￿exible. Maximization over these factors is thus subsumed by R(A,e,h) and variations in inputs costs are
part of A.
14The literature uses both a quadratic speci￿cation in which the cost is in terms of per cent diﬀer-
ences (Bils[1987]) and speci￿cations in which adjustment costs are in terms of employment changes alone
(Hamermesh[1989]).
8The function ω(e,h) represents total compensation to workers as a function of the
number of workers and their average hours. This compensation function is critical for
generating movements in both hours and the number of workers.15 For our analysis, we
follow Bils [1987] and Shapiro [1986] and assume:
ω(e,h)=w ∗ e ∗
£
w0 + h + w1 (h − 40) + w2 (h − 40)
2⁄
where w is the straight-time wage.16
Using the reduced form pro￿t function and assuming quadratic costs of adjustment,
the dynamic programming problem can be solved using value function iteration. Let e =
ζ(A,e−1) be the policy function for employment. Using this policy function, employment is
determined by a stochastic diﬀerence equation.17 Let h = H (A,e−1) be the policy function
for hours.
The frictionless target, e∗(A), is the solution to the optimization problem when ν =0
for one period. For this model, the frictionless target is equivalent to the solution to
e = ζ(A,e). The adjustment process, de￿ned by iterations of e = ζ(A,e−1)g i v e nA,
converges to the frictionless target, e∗(A). Denote by h∗(A)=H(e∗(A),A) the frictionless
hours target. Note that this target will generally be a function of A.
The static target, used by CE, is de￿ned as the solution to (7) when ν =0i nall periods.
Thus employment and hours simply satisfy static ￿rst order conditions.
The top two panels of Figure 1 illustrate the policy functions and employment targets
for two realizations of A. Both the frictionless and static employment targets are indicated
in the ￿gure. Since plants take future adjustment costs into account in determining the
frictionless target, they will not be as responsive as the static target to changes in the
productivity shock. In general, the frictionless target will be less than the static target for
above average productivity shocks and vice versa for below average shocks.
As a result, the frictionless hours target for a given shock, h∗ (A), will also deviate from
the static hours target, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.18 If the frictionless
employment target is below the static employment target for a given shock, then the
15A simpler model with a production function, a ￿xed wage rate and an employment adjustment cost
is not suﬃcient as there is no ￿penalty￿ for overworking employees. Thus, as long as there is no cost
to adjusting hours, ￿rms will only modify hours in reaction to shocks. There will be no need to adjust
employees.
16In contrast to Sargent [1978] there is no exogenous component to wage variation. In his study, variations
in productivity were much larger than variations in wages.
17See Sargent [1978] for a further discussion of this problem and the solution methodology for ￿nding
the path of employment adjustment.
18See Appendix A for a discussion of the static hours target. It is determined from the ￿rst-order
condition for hours if employment is set at its static target. As discussed in Appendix A, the static hours
target is not state dependent.
9frictionless hours target will be above the static hours target to compensate for the lower
level of employment.
3.2 Partial Adjustment Model
Within this model, one can be much more explicit about the partial adjustment struc-
ture and the resulting ￿at hazard speci￿cation. The partial adjustment model is a policy
function de￿ned by:
e = λe
∗ +( 1− λ)e−1 (9)
for λ ∈ [0,1]. The dependence of e on A comes through the speci￿cation of the￿target,￿





But, what is (9) a solution to? When does it solve (7)?
The standard partial adjustment structure is often ￿rationalized￿ by solving for the
optimal transition path towards the target in the presence of quadratic adjustment costs
and a quadratic loss function.20 Consider a dynamic programming problem given by:
$(e










where the loss depends on the gap between the current stock of workers (e)a n dt h et a r g e t
(e∗). Here there is no model of the target; it is taken as an exogenous process. Assume
that e∗ follows an AR(1) process with serial correlation of ρ. Working with this quadratic




If the shocks follow a random walk (ρ = 1), then partial adjustment is optimal (λ1 + λ2 =
1).21
The optimal policy may not take the partial adjustment form for two reasons. First,
(10) is an approximation to (7). Second, shocks may not follow a random walk.
19Clearly e∗ ought to be the frictionless rather than the static target since adjustment will stop for a
dynamically optimizing plant once that target is reached.
20Alternatively, consider a dynamic optimization framework, such as (7), and assume that the within
period return function can be written as a quadratic function and that shocks follow a random walk. Then,
the optimal employment level is a linear function of the static optimum and the lagged level of employment.
This can be seen directly, for example, from the ￿rst-order conditions provided in Sargent [1978] in the
linear quadratic framework.
21Essentially guess that the policy function is linear in the state variables and use that to solve the ￿rst
104 Empirical Implications
Our goal is to consider the empirical implications of the quadratic adjustment cost model.
We do so ￿rst by looking at the aggregate implications, as in the regression results reported
in CE and CEH. We then characterize the microeconomic hazards in terms of the response of
employment to the employment gap and ￿nally study the determination of the employment
gap.
In the following analysis, we use our model to directly measure the employment gap at
the plant level. We call this the observed gap. As noted above, there are two commonly
used notions of targets: the frictionless and static targets. Corresponding to these two
measures of the target are thus two measures of the observed gap: the frictionless gap
and the static gap. We can measure these directly using our model as a data generating
mechanism.
Also, we can follow CEH and try to infer the employment gap from observed hours
variations, using (4) where θ is estimated from (5). We term this the CEH gap. Following
CEH, we provide two measures of this gap based upon two estimates of θ. The ￿rst uses the
full simulated panel and the second uses a subsample comprised of observations entailing
large changes in employment and hours, where large is de￿ned as a change greater than
one standard deviation.
4.1 Parameterization
To solve the dynamic programming problem given in (7), we need to calibrate a number of
parameters and specify functional forms. We assume:
￿ a Cobb-Douglas production function in which hours and workers are perfectly sub-
stitutable. Labor￿s share is 0.65 and the markup is set at 25%.
￿ the compensation function uses the estimates of Bils [1987] and Shapiro [1986]:
{w0,w 1,w 2} = {1.5,0.19,0.03} and the straight time wage, w, is normalized to 0.05.
The elasticity of the wage with respect to hours is close to 1 on average
order condition from the dynamic programming problem. The solution has
λ1 =
1+βκλ1ρ




(1 + κ − βκ(λ2 − 1))
.
11￿ as estimated in Cooper-Haltiwanger [2000], the pro￿tability shocks are represented by
a ￿rst-order Markov process and are decomposed into aggregate (A) and idiosyncratic
components (ε). We assume that A ∈ {0.9,1.1} and ε takes on 15 possible values.
The serial correlation for the plant-level shocks is 0.83 and it is 0.8 for the aggregate
shocks. The standard deviation of the plant-level shocks is set at 0.3 as estimated in
Cooper and Haltiwanger [2000].22
￿ We consider two values of the adjustment cost parameter, ν =1a n dν =1 0 , as these
lead to adjustment rates such that the half-life of a gap is between 1 quarter and 1
year.23
Given this parameterization of the basic functions, the optimization problem given in
(7) is solved using value function iteration to obtain policy functions. Using these policy
functions, we create a simulated panel data set where the number of plants equals 1000
and the number of time periods is 1000.24
4.2 Aggregate Implications
Given that both CE and CEH present quantitative results on the estimation of hazard
functions from time series data, we begin by analyzing the aggregate implications of the
quadratic adjustment model. We create a time series by aggregating across the plants
in our simulated panel data set. Following CE and CEH, we can investigate aggregate
implications by looking at the relationship between aggregate employment changes and the
cross-sectional distribution of the employment gap given by (6).
Table 1 presents estimates for three speci￿cations of a hazard function (Φ(z)): constant,





1 z + λ2z2 for z<0
λ0 + λ
+
1 z + λ2z2 for z>0
(11)
22Cooper-Haltiwanger obtain these estimates from a model in which there were, by assumption, no ad-
justment costs to labor. Thus we view this parameterization as a starting point and explore the robustness
of our ￿ndings to variations in these parameters of the distributions. The shocks do not follow a random
walk. Relatedly, in Sargent [1978] all stochastic processes are found to be stationary.
23We are grateful to Dan Hamermesh for suggestions on this parameterization.
24CEH have a panel with 36 quarters and 10,000 plants. Our results are robust to adding more plants.
We analyze only 1000 plants to reduce computation time. The number of time periods is set at 1000 to
minimize simulation error.
25To be clear, this hazard function is imposed on the aggregate data which itself comes from a panel
created by the optimal decisions at the plant level. These optimal decisions will not necessarilly obey any
of these simple hazard speci￿cations.
12which nests diﬀerent speci￿cations of the hazard function.
CEH restrict λ2 to be zero and estimate λ
−
1 =1 .30 and λ
+
1 =1 .32. In contrast, CE
estimate a quadratic hazard given by:
Φ(z)=￿ λ0 + ￿ λ2(z − z0)
2 (12)
where z0 is a constant.26 Expanding this hazard, the parameters (￿ λ0,￿ λ2,z 0)c a nb ee s -




1 .27 CE (Table 2, BLS) report
(￿ λ0 =0 .02, ￿ λ2 =0 .53,z 0 = −0.82).We provide estimates for both speci￿cations of the
hazard function using both the observed gap and the CEH gap for the two types of targets.
4.2.1 Frictionless Target
The results for the frictionless target computed using the observed gap are reported at
the top of Table 1a. When the appropriate target is used, the results are consistent with
intuition: the estimated hazard is ￿at with an adjustment rate that is 0.5 when ν =1a n d
0.19 when the adjustment cost is larger, ν =1 0 . There is essentially no evidence of any
economically signi￿cant nonlinearity: the model with a constant hazard ￿ts quite well.28
The R2 for this speci￿cation is essentially 1.29
There are two deviations from this benchmark associated with two potential ￿errors￿
in measuring the gap. First, as in CE, the static target, which is easy to compute, may be
used instead of the frictionless target. The second is the CEH measure of the gap.
4.2.2 Static Target
Using the static target one would strongly reject the hypothesis that the hazard function
is ￿at in favor of either the piecewise linear or quadratic cases as shown in the lower
portion of Table 1a. For example, in the quadratic speci￿cation, we ￿nd that when ν =1 ,
λ2 is estimated at 0.33 with a standard error of 0.01. Further, the coeﬃcients in the




1 =1 .16) are also statistically and economically
signi￿cant. The nonlinearity is also statistically signi￿cant when ν = 10 for both the
piecewise linear and quadratic cases. Note though that here the R2 for the constant hazard
26CE introduce additional features that we have avoided. As discussed in their Section IV.2, they apply
an idiosyncratic shock to the distribution of plant deviations. We are not sure what this transformation
represents in our structural model and thus we have excluded it from our analysis.






28Though the regression coeﬃcients on some of the nonlinear pieces are statistically signi￿cant, they add
essentially nothing to the goodness of ￿t and the estimated coeﬃcients are very small.
29This high value of R2 partly re￿ects the limited nature of the model: there are no other factors of
production with adjustment costs, there are no shocks to the adjustment costs directly, no measurement
error, etc.
13model is quite high (0.91) so that adding these higher moments of the cross sectional
distribution, while signi￿cant, do not lead to the large increases in R2 reported by CE.
The table also includes the quadratic speci￿cation given in (12) in the bottom row of




1 has been imposed. From this regression, we estimate (￿ λ0 =
−0.35,￿ λ2 =0 .54,z 0 = −0.15) when ν =1a n d( ￿ λ0 = −0.22, ￿ λ2 =0 .17,z 0 = −0.23) when
ν = 10. The coeﬃcients are all signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. 30
The diﬀerence in results between using the frictionless and static targets to determine
the employment gap can be viewed as the introduction of measurement error into the
regression. If the static target is equal to the frictionless target, we should not see any
change in results. Figure 1, however, illustrated the diﬀerence between the two targets.
Therefore, switching to the static target is likely to lead to a bias in the estimate as there
is not a constant diﬀerence between these targets.
Using the hazard given in (12), one can rewrite the aggregate employment growth
































i,t is the ith uncentered moment of the cross-sectional distribution of the static gap
in period t and m
f
i is the corresponding measure for the frictionless gap. The error term
contains three measurement error terms in addition to εt. If any of these measurement
errors are correlated with the moments of the static employment gap, then a bias in the
estimates will be present.
To study this bias, we regress the measurement error in the ￿rst uncentered moment on
the three moments of the static gap.31 We estimate (−1.66,0.37,1.07) as the coeﬃcients
on the three moments. The standard errors are all less than 0.04. These results indicate
that the error is related to the static gap in a nonlinear way, thus leading to the nonlinear
estimates of the adjustment function.
4.2.3 CEH Measure of the GAP
Second, the frictionless target could be inferred from variations in observed hours, as in
CEH, opening the possibility of measurement error. The results for this case are in Table
1b. The diﬀerent sections refer to alternative treatments of the data. ￿Full sample￿ means
that we use the complete sample while ￿big change￿ refers to a sample constructed by in-
30At least with regards to the quadratic term and ν = 1, our estimates are not at odds with the CE
￿ndings. Again, our methodology does not include the extra step of randomization across the gaps. Also,
our model does not imply that z0 should be present: if there is a zero gap, there should be no adjustment.
31Thanks to Peter Klenow for discussions on this characterization of the measurement error.
14cluding only observations in which the employment and hours changes exceed one standard
deviation, as in the sample splits of CEH.
Note that for both speci￿cations (ν ∈ {1,10}), the constant hazard hypothesis is re-
jected for both the full and big change samples. In fact, the ￿at hazard speci￿cation yields
rather nonsensical results: ie. the adjustment rate is in excess of 100% for the full sample
and is actually negative (ν = 10) once we concentrate on the large changes in employment
and hours. Further, there is a nontrivial increase in the R2 associated with adding these
terms to the hazard function, particularly for the big change sample with ν =1 .
4.2.4 Summary
Thus from the aggregate estimation results we ￿nd that the hazard function is essentially
￿at iﬀ the gap is properly measured. Using either the CE or the CEH procedure for
measuring the gap, one would reject the ￿at hazard speci￿cations and conclude that ad-
justment costs were not quadratic. Here we have seen that this conclusion is not valid: the
measurement of the gap introduces the nonlinearities, not the economic behavior.
We now turn to further explorations of these rejections of the constant hazard model. To
what extent do they re￿ect aggregation? To what extent do they re￿ect mismeasurement
of the gap created in the estimation of auxiliary model that links hours variations to the
target? We address these questions in turn.
4.3 Micro Hazards
For the analysis of plant level hazards, we consider an expanded speci￿cation of the hazard














z term in the hazard function is added to re￿ect the possible presence of
a constant term in the policy function (φ(z)). For this speci￿cation, the constant haz-
ard prediction is that all coeﬃcients except for λ0 should be insigni￿cantly diﬀerent from




1 are signi￿cant, then the hazard function is linear but not ￿at.
The estimates (standard errors in parenthesis) for this exercise are presented in Table 2a
(observed gap) and 2b (CEH gap).
4.3.1 Frictionless Target
Using the frictionless target measure, the hazard rate (λ0) is very close to the estimates
obtained from aggregate data for both values of ν.F o r e x a m p l e a t ν =1 ,t h ev a l u eo f
15λ0 from the micro hazard is 0.50, the same as the value estimated from the aggregate
data. Evidently, there is no bias introduced by the aggregation per se as long as the
appropriate measure of the target is being used. Using this gap measure there is no evidence
of nonlinearity at the plant level as λ2 is essentially zero. While there is some evidence for




1 sum to zero.








into the estimation can only account for eight percent
of the total sum of squared deviations from a constant hazard hypothesis. Also important
to note is that the inverse of z has no explanatory power, ξ0 =0 .T h e s es a m ep o i n t sh o l d
for ν =1 0 .
For the observed frictionless gap, Figure 2 presents the simulated data when ν =1 .
This is intended as a counterpart to Figure 1a in CEH. The top part of the ￿gure contains
a scatterplot of the observed frictionless gap and the rate of employment adjustment,
expressed as the change in employment divided by the employment gap, along with a
line depicting a constructed average adjustment rate. Note that this relationship is a bit
￿cloudy￿ as the gap measure is not quite a suﬃc i e n ts t a t i s t i cf o re m p l o y m e n ta d j u s t m e n t .
The bottom panel shows the cross sectional distribution of the employment gaps pro-
duced by the model. This distribution is slightly more diﬀuse than the corresponding
p i c t u r ei nF i g u r e1 ai nC E H .F i g u r e5p r e s e n t st h es a m ep a n e l sf o rt h ec a s eo fν = 10.
Here the average adjustment rate line has a slightly positive slope.
4.3.2 Static Target
For the case of the static target we ￿nd evidence of signi￿cant nonlinearity at the plant-
level. Figure 3 displays the scatterplot of adjustment rates and a constructed average
adjustment measure using the static target.
Starting ￿rst with a simple constant hazard speci￿cation for v = 1, the estimate for λ0
reported in Table 2a is 0.35, much lower than the 0.5 estimate using the frictionless target.
This re￿ects the fact that the static target does not incorporate the cost of adjustment as
does the frictionless target. As described earlier, Figure 1 illustrates how measures of static
employment targets corresponding to above and below-average shocks will be exaggerated
relative to the frictionless target. Therefore, the static target on average will indicate that
more adjustment is required, i.e. a larger gap exists, and the adjustment rate for a given
change in employment will be smaller.
The more general hazard speci￿cation (including all but 1
z) indicates marginally sig-
ni￿cant nonlinearities, but the R2 on this regression is 0. However, when the inverse of z
is added to a constant hazard speci￿cation, its coeﬃcient, ξ0, is strongly signi￿cant and
the R2 increases to 0.42. This result indicates that there is not a proportional relationship
between the static gap and changes in employment.32 The results corresponding to ν =1 0
32This result can again be understood from the perspective of the measurement error induced by using
16are similar. Though the nonlinearities are signi￿cant, the only change in the R2 coincides
with the inclusion of 1
z.
4.3.3 CEH Measure of the Gap
For the hazards estimated at the plant level using the CEH measure of the gap, there is
little to be discerned from the results in Table 2b. The hazard rate (λ0)i se s t i m a t e dt ob e
much greater than the value associated with the frictionless target, often in excess of 100%
adjustment, depending on the value of ν. As we shall see, the problems with this measure
of the gap are a direct consequence of severely biased estimates of θ.
4.4 Estimates of θ
The ￿nal step in understanding the aggregate results and the CEH methodology is to
explore the estimates of θ, the relationship between the gap and hours. The issue is to
determine if problems with the CEH gap measure stem from the estimation of θ.A sC E
did not estimate θ, this issue does not arise directly in their analysis. However, there is
still the issue of whether the θ they impose from their static model generates a reasonable
gap measure.
Table 3 summarizes the estimates of this parameter for a number of diﬀerent speci￿-
cations. The ￿rst two rows correspond to the estimated value of θ using the actual gap
that we construct in our simulated environment. Of these rows, the ￿rst measure uses the
frictionless target to create the gap while the second measure uses the static target. The
other rows use the CEH approach to estimate θ. Note that their results do not depend
on the de￿nition of the target since it is not observed to them. Results are again reported
for the two diﬀerent parameterizations of the quadratic adjustment cost model, ν =1a n d
ν =1 0 .
First note that the sign on θ from the CEH regression is opposite that obtained when
the observed gap is used in the regression, as in (3). Since their methodology relies on θ
to construct a measure of the gap, this diﬀerence is important to understand.
Recall that in (5), the error term contains the change in the employment target level.
Assuming that changes in hours are uncorrelated with changes in employment targets, the
sign on θ will be determined by the unconditional correlation between changes in hours
and changes in employment. In the simulated data, this correlation is 0.69, indicating that
the sign on θ in (5) will be negative. The driving force behind this positive correlation is
the partial adjustment to changes in employment targets. When plants experience produc-
tivity shocks, they respond to changes in employment targets by changing both hours and
e m p l o y m e n ti nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n .
the static rather than the frictionless employment target.
17CEH acknowledge that hours and employment target changes could be correlated, so
they only use observations in which there are large changes in both hours and employment
to estimate θ. They argue that in these periods, the changes in employment targets will
be swamped by the eﬀects of large changes in hours and employment. But in a model
of convex adjustment, the only periods in which there will be large changes in hours and
employment are periods in which there are large changes in employment target levels. This
is evident in the simulated data: the correlation between changes in hours and changes in
employment target levels is 0.95 in the full sample and 0.99 in the CEH-criterion subsample.
To obtain an unbiased estimate of θ in a model of quadratic costs of adjustment, controlling
for changes in employment target levels is essential.
The implications of the sign reversal are displayed in Figure 4, which shows a sample of
employment changes, deviation in hours, and various measures of the employment gap from
a simulation of the model. The upper panel displays the two measures of the actual gap,
and the lower panel contains two measures of the gap constructed from CEH estimates
of θ. The diﬀerences between the gap measures are readily apparent once the scales of
the two panels are taken into account. The series for employment changes and hours
deviation are identical in both panels. In the upper panel, the gap measures have a higher
degree of variability than employment changes, indicative of the expected plant behavior
of partial adjustment when faced with convex costs of adjustment. In the lower panel,
employment changes greatly exceed the CEH gap measures. Since hours and employment
are positively correlated, the eﬀect of the negative sign on θ is essentially to force the
constructed employment gap to be a dampened version of the change in employment. The
correlation between the actual measures of the gap and the CEH gap measures are positively
correlated (approximately 0.52 for the big change subsample at ν = 1), but the conclusions
to be drawn from analysis of these series are very diﬀerent.
As for the CE approach, the estimate of θ obtained from using the frictionless and static
gap measures diﬀer. In fact, the estimate using the static target, as in CE, produces an
estimate of θ that is exactly equal to the one obtained analytically.33 However, the gap
measure produced by using this estimate of θ does not correspond with the frictionless gap
measure. The diﬀerence is due to the fact that the frictionless hours target is dependent
upon the productivity shock, whereas the static hours target is independent of the shock.
This distinction between the two hours targets has important implications for the mea-
surment of the gaps in CEH, represented by (3). A complicated log-linearization in the
form of (18) may be constructed using the frictionless targets. The relationship between
33Using (18) from Appendix A and the given parameterization, CE would ￿nd θ is equal to 8.8.
18the employment gap and hours deviations used by CEH can be written as
￿ zi,t = θ(hi,t − h
∗ (Ai,t)).
Using the correct target for hours and the frictionless employment gap, we do obtain the
analytically calculated value of θ. But the problem for the CEH methodology is that there
are now two unobservables since the hours target cannot be approximated by a constant
mean. Even if an estimate for θ is available, the employment gap cannot be accurately
constructed without observing the hours target. The errors caused by having the correct θ
and using the mean level of hours to approximate the hours target is illustrated precisely
by the observed static target results above for the aggregate and micro hazards.
4.5 Robustness
The conclusions we have reached concerning the inferences from the gap methodology are,
admittedly, based upon the selection of parameters for the plant level optimization problem
and for the driving processes. It is natural to explore the robustness of these ￿ndings.
4.5.1 Speci￿cation of Optimization Problem
With regards to the speci￿cation of the plant level optimization problem, we consider two
variations. First, our production function assumes that the labor input is the product of




with αe =0 .72,αh =0 .77.34 In this case, our conclusions on the methods of CE and CEH
do not change: nonlinearities remain in the aggregate regressions, using (12) as the hazard
function, as shown in the second row of Table 4.
Second, as noted earlier, the literature is somewhat mixed on the speci￿cation of the
quadratic adjustment cost model. In our model, we assume that the cost depends on the





Using this speci￿cation of the adjustment cost function does not have a signi￿cant eﬀect
on any of our conclusions: nonlinearities remain in the aggregate regressions (see row 3 of
Table 4).
34The values for αe and αh are produced by assuming constant returns to scale in capital and employment,
a markup of 25%, and using the production relationship between hours and employment reported in CE.
194.5.2 Shocks
Of particular concern are the speci￿cations of the stochastic processes as these parame-
terizations came from Cooper and Haltiwanger [2000] who investigated a model without
costs of adjusting labor in a panel of approximately 7,000 plants over the 1972-88 period.
Thus it is important to consider robustness with respect to the process governing both the
aggregate and plant speci￿cs h o c k s .
For the idiosyncratic shocks, our analysis uses the standard deviation and serial correla-
tion reported by Cooper-Haltiwanger and creates a state space with 15 shocks and a transi-
tion matrix that mimics this process assuming that the shocks are normally distributed.35
To explore the sensitivity of the results to the idiosyncratic shock parameterization, we
compute results over a range of plausible alternative parameter settings. Table 5 displays
the corresponding results for the aggregate regression, where the static targets are used to
measure the employment gaps. The serial correlation values range from 0.7 to 0.99 and the
standard deviations range from 0.1 to 0.4. The actual values used in the baseline estimates
are (0.83,0.3). In the left side of the table, where ν = 1, increases in the serial correlation
lead to higher estimates of λ2, the quadratic coeﬃcient of the adjustment function. When
the standard deviation is increased, the linear coeﬃcient, λ1, increases, but the eﬀect on
λ0 and λ2 depends on the level of serial correlation. For high levels of serial correlation, an
increase in the standard deviation leads to small increases in the nonlinearity, but the level
of nonlinearity decreases for lower levels of serial correlation. In all of the results, however,
the hypothesis of a constant or linear hazard function would be rejected. The right side of
Table 5 shows results when the scalar on the adjustment cost function, ν, is increased to
10. The conclusions are very similar.
We also consider variations in the representation of the aggregate shock process and
here ￿nd that the speci￿cation can matter. Cooper-Haltiwanger represent the aggregate







which reproduces the serial correlation and variance of aggregate shocks. By construction,
the distribution of shocks is uniform. Note that there are two aspects of the approximation:
the number of elements in the state space and the elements in the matrix.
An alternative estimate of the variance and serial correlation comes from Sargent [1978]
who estimates an aggregate shock process in his model of dynamic labor demand. Sargent
reports an aggregate shock process in which the serial correlation is 0.94. Row 4 of Table
35Thus we follow the procedure outlined in Tauchen [1986].
204 shows our results for that speci￿cation of the aggregate shocks.36 Again our ￿ndings are
robust to this alternative speci￿cation of the aggregate shocks.
However, changes in the ￿neness and the spread of the state space can in￿uence our
￿ndings with regards to the CE aggregate results (the hazard given in (12)). Suppose that
we increase the number of elements in the aggregate state space from 2 to 11.37 In this
case, for the aggregate regression we ￿nd that the level of nonlinearity is lower (row 5 of
Table 4), but is still strongly signi￿cant. For ν = 10, our results are similar.
To study the spread of the state space, we set the endpoints one standard deviation
above and below the mean, where the endpoints were previously set 0.4 standard deviations
from the mean. We use an 11-point state space representation where the aggregate shocks
here go from 0.77 to 1.3. This change produces a substantial decrease in the estimated
degree of nonlinearity in the aggregate regression (row 6 of Table 4). The estimate of λ0 is
now close the the constant hazard estimate of 0.4 for this speci￿cation. Similar results are
reported for ν = 10. In both cases, one would still reject a ￿at hazard, but the magnitude of
the degree of nonlinearity is much smaller than baseline estimates. Interestingly, the degree
of nonlinearity in plant-level employment adjustment actually increases when the endpoints
of the aggregate state space are expanded. Further, even for the aggregate regressions, there
is evidence of signi￿cant nonlinearity in the piecewise linear speci￿cation. Note further that
these aggregate results hold when there is an implausibly large domain for the aggregate
shocks.
5 Conclusions
The point of this paper was to assess the inferences of CE and CEH that aggregate em-
ployment dynamics depend upon the cross sectional distribution of employment gaps. The
paper argues that due to measurement problems, a researcher might ￿nd that the cross sec-
tional distribution matters for aggregate time series even if adjustment costs are quadratic
due to measurement problems. Thus the time series evidence presented by CE and CEH is
not convincing. So, despite the overwhelming evidence that plants adjustment is nonlinear,
the question of whether this matters for aggregate employment dynamics remains an open
issue.
Can we do better? Within the gap methodology, it is apparent that the CEH method-
ology is inferior to that employed by CE.38 However, even the CE approach falls short due,
36Sargent did not estimate the mean value of the shock, so we are unable to normalize the estimate
of the variance of the innovations for use in our model. Therefore, we set the variance at 0.008, which
corresponds to the estimates by Cooper-Haltiwanger. Here shocks are drawn from a normal distribution.
37In order to solve the model we also have to reduce the number of idiosyncratic shocks from 15 discrete
points to 5 points. This reduction leads to only a marginal change in results.
38We understand that data limitations led CEH to their formulation.
21primarily due to state contingent diﬀerences between the frictionless and static employment
targets. We have seen that adding a state dependent hours target to the model yields the
appropriate frictionless target. However, implementing this procedure with actual data is
less clear.
There are, however, competing approaches to estimating a parameterized version of an
adjustment cost function nesting both convex and nonconvex costs that do not rely on gap
measures. Examples of this now exist in the literature on investment, durables and price
setting. These involve using indirect inference techniques to match the moments produced
by simulations of a structural model with those observed.39 Clearly, labor is next.
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22Appendix A: CE Gap and Target
CE use this basic framework to generate some analytic results on θ, the parameter that con-
nects variations in hours with variations in the number workers and the target employment
level. Their approach is completely static. They maximize
R(A,e,h) − ω(e,h)
for the optimal choice of hours given (A,e) yielding a ￿rst order condition of:
Rh(A,e,h)=ωh(e,h). (16)
The level of hours satisfying this ￿rst order condition is also appropriate in a dynamic
setting since the hours choice entails no costs of adjustment. Similarly, they optimize over
the number of workers setting hours at ﬂ h implying:
Re(A,e,ﬂ h)=ωe(e,ﬂ h). (17)
This ￿rst-order condition is intended to characterize a target level of employment as hours
are set at their optimal level. We let e∗∗(A) denote the solution to (17). This is the static
target and it is, by construction, independent of the speci￿cation of the adjustment cost
function. Given e∗∗(A)a n dt h es p e c i ￿cations above for the compensation and produc-
tion functions, plants will always choose the same steady-state level of hours per worker,
h∗∗ (A)=ﬂ h, ∀A.
Log-linearizing (17) given the functional forms yields






where ￿￿ xt￿ is a percent deviation from steady state in period t. Since the static target for
hours is independent of deviations in the productivity shock, we can express the relationship
between the static employment target and the productivity shock from (17) as
￿ At =( 1− α)￿ e
∗∗
t .
Substitution of this relationship into the log-linearized version of (16) yields:
(1 − α)￿ e
∗∗
t +( α − 1)￿ ht + α￿ et =￿ et + ξw￿ ht
where ξw is the marginal wage elasticity with respect to hours.40 This can be rewritten as
￿ e
∗∗
t − ￿ et =
1 − α + ξw
1 − α
￿ ht. (18)
40The marginal wage elasticity can be expressed as ξw = 2w2ﬂ h
w(1+w1+2w2(ﬂ h−40)).
23Using the mean level of observed hours as an approximation for ﬂ h, equation (3) denotes
t h es a m er e l a t i o na s( 1 8 )w i t hθ equal to
1−α+ξw
1−α .41
Relative to the parameterization of our model, CE would set θ =8 .8 using the following
analysis. The marginal wage elasticity is evaluated at the static steady state level of 37.3
hours. From this, ξw =2 .18.
The value of α is given by optimization of capital (K) in the fully speci￿ed production









where αL and αK are the respective labor and capital shares, η is the price elasticity of
demand, and r is the rental rate on capital. Maximization with respect to capital leads to








With η set equal to 5, corresponding to a markup of 25%, and assuming constant returns
to scale in capital and labor with αL = .65, α is equal to 0.72. Using these calculation, θ
can be determined from θ =
1−α+ξw
1−α .
41We are grateful to Robert King for pushing us to make this connection.
24Table 1a:  Aggregate Implications
ν  = 1 ν  = 10
Specification const λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 R
2
const λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 R
2
Observed gap:
frictionless target -0.012 0.50 1.00 0.001 0.19 1.00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.001 0.51 -0.04 0.03 1.00 -0.001 0.20 0.002 -0.02 1.00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.012 0.54 -0.04 1.00 0.001 0.19 0.003 1.00
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
static target 0.03 0.34 0.91 0.01 0.07 0.86
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
-0.03 -1.04 1.46 1.16 0.96 -0.02 -0.35 0.39 0.29 0.89
(0.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
 0.03 -0.10 0.33 0.95 0.01 -0.12 0.10 0.88
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.03 -0.34 0.16 0.16 0.54 0.96 -0.03 -0.21 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.90
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)Table 1b:  Aggregate Implications
ν  = 1 ν  = 10
Specification const λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 R
2
const λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 R
2
CEH gap:
full sample 0.00 1.53 0.51 0.00 1.43 0.34
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) 999
0.30 9.48 -62.53 -18.74 0.76 -0.06 -2.50 107.94 26.55 0.40
(0.01) (0.48) (2.98) (1.67) (0.01) (1.19) (20.19) (21.98) (999.00)
0.03 -0.28 30.29 0.58 0.00 -2.42 993.57 0.37
(0.00) (0.16) (2.51) (0.00) (0.61) (157.71) (999.00)
big change 0.00 0.56 0.06 0.00 -0.61 0.12
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.05) 999
0.39 0.62 -27.87 31.16 0.76 0.02 -8.96 144.87 184.75 0.15
(0.01) (0.39) (2.47) (1.82) (0.00) (1.70) (32.74) (34.85) 999
0.02 -4.06 118.87 0.32 0.00 -4.88 1500.83 0.14
(0.00) (0.25) (6.21) (0.00) (0.83) (293.07) (999.00)Table 2a: Estimates of Policy Function
ν  = 1 ν  = 10
Specification λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 ξ 0 R
2
λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 ξ 0 R
2
Observed gap:
frictionless target 0.50 0.00 0.19 0.00
(0.000) (0.000)
0.50 -0.04 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.50 -0.06 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.20 0.19 -0.19 0.07
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.50 0.00 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.50 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.03
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.50 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.19 -0.19 0.00 0.07
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
static target 0.35 0.00 0.10 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
0.34 0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.14 -0.04 -0.07 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.36 0.04 -0.13 0.06 0.00 0.20 -0.27 -0.31 0.15 0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.32 0.05 0.42 0.09 0.01 0.12
(0.00) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000)
0.23 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.42 0.10 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000)
0.13 0.56 0.64 -0.31 0.05 0.42 0.13 -0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.01 0.12
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.000) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.000)Table 2b: Estimates of Policy Function
ν  = 1 ν  = 10
Specification λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 ξ 0 R
2
λ 0 λ 1
+ λ 1
− λ 2 ξ 0 R
2
CEH gap:
full sample 1.64 0.00 1.62 0.00
(0.12) (0.06)
1.73 -1.00 -0.77 0.00 1.62 -0.20 -0.14 0.00
(0.19) (1.86) (1.58) (0.10) (3.01) (3.14)
1.93 -4.80 -5.31 13.67 0.00 1.78 -13.07 -12.51 162.12 0.00
(0.25) (3.55) (3.95) (10.90) (0.13) (8.04) (7.82) (93.88)
1.65 -0.01 0.00 1.60 -0.01 0.02
(0.12) (0.000) (0.06) (0.000)
1.75 -0.59 -1.25 -0.01 0.00 1.59 4.56 -3.93 -0.01 0.02
(0.19) (1.86) (1.57) (0.00) (0.09) (2.98) (3.11) (0.00)
1.98 -5.12 -6.66 16.28 -0.01 0.00 1.70 -4.38 -12.53 112.68 -0.01 0.02
(0.25) (3.55) (3.94) (10.88) (0.00) (0.13) (7.96) (7.75) (93.01) (0.00)
big change 1.20 0.00 0.55 0.00
(0.18) (0.10)
1.40 -2.23 -2.15 0.00 0.70 -5.31 -5.64 0.00
(0.31) (3.20) (3.12) (0.18) (6.39) (6.63)
1.96 -15.55 -16.48 54.75 0.00 0.86 -21.48 -21.33 248.70 0.00
(0.42) (7.24) (7.66) (26.72) (0.26) (18.69) (18.28) (270.11)
1.18 0.03 0.02 0.55 0.00 0.00
(0.18) (0.000) (0.10) (0.000)
1.36 -4.46 0.59 0.03 0.02 0.72 -1.53 -10.85 0.00 0.00
(0.31) (3.16) (3.09) (0.00) (0.18) (6.37) (6.62) (0.00)
1.81 -15.15 -10.91 43.94 0.03 0.02 0.88 -18.00 -26.82 253.25 0.00 0.00
(0.41) (7.16) (7.57) (26.43) (0.00) (0.25) (18.65) (18.24) (269.48) (0.00)Table 3: Estimate of theta
ν  = 1 ν  = 10
Specification Estimate Std. Error R
2




frictionless target 5.00 (0.002) 0.82 983000 3.37 (0.002) 0.82 983000
static target 8.95 (0.000) 1.00 983000 9.01 (0.001) 0.99 983000
CEH gap:
full sample -3.49 (0.004) 0.48 983000 -0.57 (0.001) 0.30 983000
big change -4.66 (0.004) 0.88 165939 -0.90 (0.001) 0.82 134407Table 4
Aggregate Implications for Alternative Specifications of the Model Using the Static Target Measure*
ν  = 1 ν  = 10
const λ 0 λ 1 λ 2 R
2
const λ 0 λ 1 λ 2 R
2
(1) Static Baseline -0.03 -0.34 0.16 0.54 0.96 -0.03 -0.21 0.08 0.17 0.90
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(2) CE/Bils -0.03 -0.33 0.16 0.54 0.96 -0.03 -0.21 0.08 0.17 0.90
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(3) (ν /2)(e-e-1)
2 -0.03 -0.33 0.12 0.52 0.96 -0.03 -0.18 0.07 0.15 0.90
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(4) Sargent (2 point dist.) -0.02 -0.20 0.12 0.43 0.96 -0.04 -0.28 0.10 0.22 0.93
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
(5) Sargent (11 point dist.) 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.32 0.93 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.11 0.87
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
(6) Sargent (11 point dist.) 0.04 0.31 0.01 0.07 0.92 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.87
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
*The regression results are for the aggregate employment growth equation (6) using the CE hazard function (12).  In simplified form, 
  the estimation equation is ∆ et = const + λ 0m1,t + λ 1m2,t + λ 2m3,t + ε t where mi,t is the i
th uncentered moment of the cross-sectional 
  distribution of the employment gap.Table 5
Aggregate Implications for Alternative Settings of the Idiosyncratic Shock Process Using the Static Target Measure*
ν  = 1 ν  = 10
ρσ const λ 0 λ 1 λ 2 R
2
const λ 0 λ 1 λ 2 R
2
0.70 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.60 0.97 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 0.43 0.97
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
0.90 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.60 0.97 0.00 -0.08 0.06 0.47 0.98
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
0.99 0.10 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.63 0.97 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.50 0.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
0.70 0.30 -0.05 -0.43 0.16 0.44 0.95 -0.04 -0.19 0.07 0.13 0.89
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.90 0.30 -0.02 -0.20 0.13 0.58 0.97 -0.03 -0.22 0.09 0.22 0.92
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.99 0.30 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.66 0.97 -0.01 -0.09 0.08 0.47 0.98
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
0.70 0.40 -0.06 -0.44 0.15 0.33 0.94 -0.04 -0.14 0.05 0.08 0.88
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.90 0.40 -0.03 -0.33 0.16 0.52 0.96 -0.04 -0.20 0.08 0.15 0.90
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.99 0.40 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.66 0.97 -0.01 -0.13 0.10 0.45 0.98
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
*The regression results are for the aggregate employment growth equation (6) using the CE hazard function (12).  In simplified form, 
  the estimation equation is ∆ et = const + λ 0m1,t + λ 1m2,t + λ 2m3,t + ε t where mi,t is the i
th uncentered moment of the cross-sectional 
  distribution of the employment gap.
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                         Figure 2
Average adjustment rate function and scatterplot 


























































                         Figure 3
Average adjustment rate function and scatterplot 




































































                         Figure 4
Simulated employment gaps:  measured directly 








































                         Figure 5
Average adjustment rate function and scatterplot 
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